




Orbis Idearum, Volume 7, Issue 2 (2019), Pages 41-53 
THE IDEA OF JUDICIAL REVIEW  
IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.  
THE CONTEXT OF CREATING AND EARLY 
JUDGMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT 
Monika Wrzoszczyk 
Jagiellonian University in Krakow 
monika.wrzoszczyk@doctoral.uj.edu.pl 
Received 8 December 2019, Revised 27 December,  
Accepted 31 December, Available online 7 January 2020 
ABSTRACT 
The judicial review owes its popularity primarily to the judgment in the Marbury v. 
Madison case, which gave American courts the power to strike down laws, statutes, 
and certain government actions that were viewed to violate the Constitution. Alt-
hough today there is no doubt that the Supreme Court not only has such power but 
also uses it, we will not find a rule in the US Constitution that in explicit terms, (ex-
pressis verbis), would give it such competence and its origin may arouse much con-
troversy due to the context of Judge Marshall’s judgment. The paper presents the 
problems of systematizing the role of judicial review in the tradition of American 
judiciary primarily analysing the first judgements of the Supreme Court as well as 
the political background associated with the struggle for influence between federal-
ists and anti-federalists. 
KEYWORDS:  Judicial review, Supreme Court, Marbury v. Madison case, institutional 
balance 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The actions of individuals remain under the influence of many factors. One 
of the oldest and most common ways of determining behavior patterns and 
exercising supervision is legal control, characterized by coercion, formalism, 
partiality and transparency. Legal control, which evaluation criterion is em-
bedded in applicable legal regulations, requires a number of different institu-




wrote “the existence and development of all law, whether fundamental or 
common, is dependent upon the existence of a court having power to inter-
pret and enforce it. Without the court the law does not exist” (Pope 1913, 
45). 
The Supreme Court has been expanding itself to the most important judi-
cial body in the United States for over 200 years. One of the most character-
istic features that judges possesses today is judicial review, understood as 
“power enables them to declare laws passed by the State legislatures or by 
the Congress, or actions taken by the executive or governmental agencies, to 
be unconstitutional and hence avoid” (Vile 2003, 255).1 Nowadays, we are 
used to the fact that courts investigate the constitutionality of the law on the 
basis of which they adjudicate. Although the genesis of this solution is root-
ed in the seventeenth-century British political tradition and John Lock jus 
resisdenti, it is only the Supreme Court jurisprudence practice that has grant-
ed competence to the adjudication of unconstitutionality of acts with the 
constitution (Małajny 1985, 247). 
The Constitution of the United States of America established in Article 
III Supreme Court as an element of the judicial power which “extend to all 
Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the 
United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Au-
thority (…).” The issues of the establishment of inferior courts were left to 
the discretion of Congress. Therefore, it was obliged to create a full and ef-
fective court system. The first meeting of the new Congress (which lasted 
from March 4, 1789, to September 29, 1789, in New York) finally resulted 
in the adoption of 26 acts, including the one adopted on September 24 – An 
Act to establish the Judicial Court of the United States, also called Judiciary 
Act (Peters 1845). By the power of this act, Congress created a three-tiered 
system of federal justice which consists of a Supreme Court with six judges, 
3 federal circuit courts and 13 federal district courts. Also, Sec. 25 stated 
that: 
 
a final judgment or decree in any suit, in the highest court of law or equity of 
a State in which a decision in the suit could be had, where is drawn in ques-
tion the validity of a treaty or statute of, or an authority exercised under the 
United States, (…) may be re-examined and reversed or affirmed in the Su-
                       
1 However, one should take some notice here. Judicial review is not a comprehensive coherent 
concept of adjudging on the incompatibility of acts, but rather a broad way of understanding 
this phenomenon, which in practice is very different between different countries. First, the 
control may be specific or abstract, depending on whether the control is prior or subsequent. 
Secondly, is it only normative acts that are assessed whether this is a broader list of subjects 
of assessment, for example, administrative decisions. Thirdly (as has already been mentioned) 
whether the task of examining the constitutionality of acts rests with a specialized, specially 
appointed body, or whether it is usually done by ordinary courts. 




preme Court of the United States upon a writ of error, the citation being 
signed by the chief justice, or judge or chancellor of the court rendering or 
passing the judgment or decree complained of, or by a justice of the Supreme 
Court of the United States (Peters 1845, 85-86). 
 
Ultimately, the Supreme Court was established on the principles of the 
constitution, and the Judiciary Act created the entire judicial system. How-
ever, this process was neither easy nor obvious, because the political envi-
ronment could not agree on the power they wanted to give to the judiciary, 
especially in the context of creating balance for the legislature. 
2. TOWARDS THE JUDICIAL REVIEW 
If the main domain of the courts was to settle legal disputes, which were 
based on specific legal norms or decisions, should there not be an idea for 
what would be the point of reference? The reference point means the most 
important act to which the system of jurisprudence is subordinated (consid-
ering its hierarchical structure). The law is always subject to change. There-
fore, one should look for a fixed element that would stabilize the system. In 
the case of the United States, it was clear that the constitution could act as 
their reference point, via the Supreme Court, to ensure adherence to the will 
of the nation. It could not only balance the legislative power, but also act as a 
guarantor of the preservation of the fundamental rights and freedoms of citi-
zens. 
If we look at the constitution, we will not find in it the concept of judicial 
review. So, did the founding fathers not consider such a function of the Su-
preme Court? Establishment of the constitution is a time when two groups - 
federalists and anti-federalists strongly argued. Anti-federalists were afraid 
of the central government, arbitrary interpretation of the text of the constitu-
tion, politicization of the court, as well as imperious actions in the name of 
the public good.  
 
The supreme court under this constitution would be exalted above all other 
power in the government, and subject to no control. (…) I question whether 
the world ever saw, in any period of it, a court of justice invested with such 
immense powers, and yet placed in a situation so little responsible. Certain it 
is, that in England, and in the several states, where we have been taught to 
believe, the courts of law are put upon the most prudent establishment, they 
are on a very different footing (Wootton 2003, 92). 
 
The problem for anti-federalists was not only the constitution but the ju-




such a system. The very power of the judges raised fears. As noted: 
 
The judges under this system will be independent in the strict sense of the 
word: To prove this I will shew – That there is no power above them that can 
control their decisions, or correct their errors. There is no authority that can 
remove them from office for any errors or want of capacity, or lower their 
salaries, and in many cases their power is superior to that of the legislature 
(Ibidem, 94). 
 
One cannot, therefore, find praise for judicial review in such rhetoric. In 
turn, the federalists were supporters of the constitution and believed that it 
would act as a guarantor of the fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens.  
 
It is not otherwise to be supposed, that the Constitution could intend to enable 
the representatives of the people to substitute their will to that of their con-
stituents. It is far more rational to suppose, that the courts were designed to 
be an intermediate body between the people and the legislature, in order, 
among other things, to keep the latter within the limits assigned to their au-
thority. The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of 
the courts. A constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by the judges, as a 
fundamental law (Ibidem, 285). 
 
They treated the judiciary as a necessary element hampering the impetus 
of legislative power. In the end, judicial review was not articulated either in 
the constitution or in the Judiciary Act. However, the literature has provided 
much evidence that this court function resulted from both acts. As far as the 
constitution is concerned, it was argued in various ways. First of all, the text 
of the constitution and the clause of supremacy are pointed out, granting the 
constitution a special place in the system of sources of law. Not only did it 
establish the primacy of federal law over the state, but, first of all, it pointed 
out that since the law is created to implement the provisions of the constitu-
tion, it must undoubtedly be compatible with it. Secondly, the constitutional 
structure, which is related to its written form and the established power divi-
sion. In regards of the written form, attention is drawn to the establishment 
of a difficult procedure for the amendment of the constitution, which, if the 
judicial review was not admissible in an easy way could be circumvented by 
the government. In turn, separation of power is connected with the mutual 
control of individual authorities as well as with the primary duty of judges 
regarding the observance of the constitution. Thirdly, the Constitution’s orig-
inal understanding. This issue concerns the issues discussed above, i.e. a dis-
pute between federalists and anti-federalists. Although the parties did not 
come to a consensus, it is difficult to find in their statements that the consti-
tution does not allow for the judicial review and that in the booklets and 




newspapers from that period the court function was confirmed (Prakash & 
Yoo 2003; Sarnecki 2001, 130). 
Regarding the Judiciary Act of 1789, it can be said that it clearly 
acknowledged such competence. First of all in Sec. 8, an oath of judges was 
established which contained the sentence “I will faithfully and impartially 
discharge and perform all the duties incumbent on me as, according to the 
best of my abilities and understanding, agreeably to the constitution, and 
laws of the United States” (Judiciary Act, 1789). If the judge ruled on the 
basis of a provision that was unconstitutional, he would violate the oath. So, 
if the legislator did not assume such a court function, the content of the oath 
should have a different shape. Even better proof that the legislator in this act 
did not rule out such possibility is mentioned earlier sec. 25. 
The political background and legislative attempts to include court compe-
tences did not bring the final recognition of judicial review as one of the 
functions of the Supreme Court, although interpreting the adopted provisions 
can be seen as above. It is important, however, to emphasize that the discus-
sions around this issue have entered the public sphere. If the Supreme Court 
was waiting for resolution in disputable matters, it was only a matter of time 
to question the conformity of a normative act or a provision with the Consti-
tution. It was so simple that the United States Constitution did not regulate 
all matters in detail, and some of its provisions were written vaguely without 
specifics. No wonder that as early as 1792, federal courts decided for the 
first time that they questioned the constitutionality of a federal act and that 
the case was referred to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. 
Hayburn’s case from 1792 concerned a congressional act that gave the 
US Circuit Courts the task of determining the pension claims of disabled war 
veterans (Hall 2000, 287). For this reason, William Hayburn went to court to 
determine his claim. He probably did not expect the US Circuit Court for the 
District of Pennsylvania to consider the congressional statute as unconstitu-
tional. In fact, the US Circuit Court had no doubt that the congress created 
functions that went beyond the constitutional role and powers of the judici-
ary in a significant way (Dichio 2018, 48). Later, United States Attorney 
General filed with the Supreme Court of its own motion an application for 
the issue of writ of mandamus for this court, so that the judges would act in 
accordance with what is prescribed by the act passed by the Congress. Alt-
hough the Supreme Court did not have to question the constitutionality of 
the act, (ultimately questioned the right of the United States Attorney Gen-
eral to submit a motion ex officio and on the basis of which he considered it 
unacceptable), it was due to the Circuit Court’s action to deal with the case 




3. THE CASE OF DANIEL HYLTON V. UNITED STATES  
The issue of taxes in the United States properly to enact the Articles of Con-
federation and Perpetual Union, was dependent on Great Britain. With the 
signing of the Confederation, the process of breaking financial ties with the 
British crown began. Art. VIII confederation granted the power to tax the 
states.  
 
All charges of war, and all other expenses that shall be incurred for the com-
mon defence or general welfare, and allowed by the united states in congress 
assembled, shall be defrayed out of a common treasury, which shall be sup-
plied by the several states, in proportion to the value of all land within each 
state, granted to or surveyed for any Person, as such land and the buildings 
and improvements thereon shall be estimated, according to such mode as the 
united states, in congress assembled, shall, from time to time, direct and ap-
point. The taxes for paying that proportion shall be laid and levied by the au-
thority and direction of the legislatures of the several states within the time 
agreed upon by the united states in congress assembled (U.S. 1781) 
 
The government, therefore, had no legal power to regulate this matter. 
This power gave the government the Constitution from 1787 in Art. 1 Sec. 2 
acknowledging that: 
 
Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several 
States [which may be included within this Union, according to their respec-
tive Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of 
free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and ex-
cluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons.] (…). (Ibidem) 
 
The state does not have its own income, it functions thanks to those that it 
manages to enforce in the form of duties or taxes. No wonder, considering 
the short period of independence from the United Kingdom, that the Con-
gress sought to quickly regulate the issue of taxes in detailed acts, especially 
so that the legislature had exclusive power to levy taxes directly on citizens. 
In 5th of June 1794 3rd Congress (1793-1795) established “An Act laying 
duties upon Carriages for the conveyance of Person”. The Act regulated the 
issue of annual taxation of carriage for the purpose of transporting a person 
“which shall be kept by or for any person, for his or her own use, or to be let 
out to hire, or for the conveying of passengers” (Peters 1848, 478). It should 
be noted that the act itself was not free of defects. Tax issues always arouse 
emotions in society. For this reason, the legislator should strive to construct 
a clear, comprehensive and simple tax system. The carriage tax was really a 
new solution. The problem arose from the interpretation of the provisions of 




the Constitution and the aforementioned Act. As previously noted, according 
to the constitution, direct taxes were to be divided between states and their 
implicated duties, imposts and excises (Becker 2008, 23). It is not surprising 
then that taxation attempts usually met with great resistance from people 
who were subjected to them. One such person was Daniel Hylton, holder of 
125 claims. That’s what led to a lawsuit in 1796. 
Hylton claimed that the 125 carriages he owned were intended for per-
sonal use, not for rent or for transporting people. For this reason, he refused 
to pay the tax he was obliged to pay under the above-mentioned Act. He be-
lieved that the law was unconstitutional because in his opinion it was contra-
ry to the provisions of the Constitution regarding the proportional division of 
taxes between states based on the census. In this way, the court settled not 
only whether the act was unconstitutional, but above all whether the tax was 
a direct tax (Levy 2000, 59-60). 
The first opinion was expressed by judge Samuel Chase. In the context of 
this type of tax, he considered that the tax on means of transport is not a di-
rect tax within the meaning of the constitution and therefore did not have to 
be divided proportionally between individual states. Moreover, as Judge 
Chase pointed out: 
 
I doubt whether a tax, by a general assessment of personal property, within 
the United States, is included within the term direct tax. As I do not think the 
tax on carriages is a direct tax, it is unnecessary, at this time, for me to deter-
mine, whether this court, constitutionally possesses the power to declare an 
act of Congress void, on the ground of its being made contrary to, and in vio-
lation of, the Constitution (…) (Peters 1835, 86). 
 
The author of the second opinion was judge William Paterson. He fo-
cused on an attempt to interpret such concepts as customs, taxes, and excise, 
as well as the general concept of taxes and the place of direct taxes in this 
system. He stressed that if the transport tax was a direct tax, it would be con-
trary to the Constitution. He then concentrated on the principle of division 
and the principle of uniformity, arguing that the principle of division con-
cerns income tax and land tax, which was a natural consequence of various 
state situations and their local causes, especially in the case of southern 
states with extensive and sparsely populated territories. He stated, like his 
predecessor, that the tax on transport is not a direct tax. He also confirmed 
the maintenance of the ruling of the previous instance but did not address the 
constitutionality of the act and the role of the court in this regard (Ibidem, 
86-90). The third opinion was formulated by judge James Iredell. He agreed 
with his predecessors about the constitutionality of transport tax. He noted 




dividuals, not for states, and introducing the principle of a division would 
mean that there is a connection between the number of wagons and the num-
ber of inhabitants. Judge James Wilson also approved the above positions, 
and Judge William Cushing did not issue an opinion (Ibidem, 90-93). 
The above ruling was one of the first to raise issues of constitutional 
compliance adopted by the Congress to an act of laying duties upon carriag-
es for private use. However, it was not a precedent. The issue of the uncon-
stitutionality of the act was raised by the plaintiff and the judges properly 
(except for Judge Chase) silenced the issue, focusing on other aspects of the 
case. Therefore, it has not been decided whether the court has any compe-
tence to annul a normative act that goes against the Constitution. It is diffi-
cult to presume if this was connected with fears of a conflict with the 
legislative authority or with the simple lack of a need for such a ruling, at a 
time when the issue of tax directness was adequately addressed. 
4. THE CASE OF WILLIAM MARBURY V. JAMES MADISON, SECRETARY OF 
STATE OF THE UNITED STATES 
In this case, the Supreme Court was a body functioning for over ten years, 
and the court system has undergone further changes. On February 27, 1801, 
the District of Columbia Act was approved by the 6th Congress and was rec-
ognized as the organic law of the District of Columbia from 1801. It created 
two districts: Washington and Alexandria and established a court in each of 
the new districts. Significant to the above matter, however, it turned out to 
be an establishment for each of counties judges of the peace. According to 
sec. 11 “there shall be appointed in and for each of the said counties, such 
number of discreet persons to be justices of the peace, as the president of the 
United States shall, from time to time, think expedient, to continue in office 
for five years.” 
In those times, the political context was the weighting of forces between 
Democrats and federalists. Different perceptions of the role of the govern-
ment, the autonomy of individual states as well as economic issues were al-
ready visible in the work on the Constitution2. However, it was only the 
beginning of the 90s the eighteenth century and an issue with the central 
bank led to the creation of two strong, opposition parties led by Alexander 
Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson. Hamilton founded The Federalist Party in 
1791. “In general, The Federalist spokesmen were national-minded, con-
                       
2 See. Bodenhamer D. J. (2018). The U.S. Constitution: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford 
University Press 2018; Judson K. F. (2013). The United States Constitution: Its History, Bill 
of Rights, and Amendments. New York: Enslow Publishing LLC.  




servative, well-to-do members of community who believed that the cure for 
the ‘excess of democracy’ was a strong national government” (Miller 1960, 
100). On the other hand, freedom of the press, freedom of speech, decentral-
ization of the federal administration and support for state rights were the 
main ideas of the Democratic-Republican Party, founded by Jefferson in 
1792 (Tarr & Benenson 2012, 160; Rusinowa 1994, 36). When we look at 
the party branch of the House of Representatives, we will quickly notice that 
the Democrats controlled the 3rd and 4th congresses in 1793-1795 and 1795-
1797 after the formation of both parties, when the president’s office was held 
by George Washington. Even the previous significant federalist influences 
did not allow them to take control of the state. This issue changed radically 
when the Federalists took over not only power at the Congress (5 in 1797-
1799 and 6 1799-1801), but also their candidate, John Adams Jr. who was 
elected president, and he held this office from March 4, 1797, to March 4, 
1801. Unlike the Democrats (until then), the Federalists managed to control 
both Congress and the Presidency (May, Ides & Grossi 2016, 1-17). But as 
we say, what goes around, comes around and nothing lasts forever.  
The elections to the 7th Congress in 1801-1803 brought great victory to 
the Democrats and restored the Congress under their control. It was the first 
blow for the federalists. The second brought the presidential election in 
which was won by Thomas Jefferson. The outgoing president realized that 
the Democratic Republican Party had won the congress, the presidential of-
fice, but could not win the federal court system. And as Charles S. Bundy 
wrote “There has probably never been a political contest in our history 
which occasioned deeper personal resentments that that” (Budny 1902, 261). 
In the beginning, Adams signed a Judiciary Act of 1801, which reduced the 
number of Supreme Court judges from six to five and replaced the judges on 
the perimeter by creating sixteen judges into six court wards. It should not 
come as a surprise that after the creation of the new 16 judges’ offices, the 
then president, who still holds the office, began to supplement them with his 
own candidates. On the other side by the power of District of Columbia Or-
ganic Act of 1801 he nominated 42 justices of the peace (23 for Washington 
and 19 for Alexandria) (Ibidem, 259-260). Considering the fact that the nom-
inations took place shortly before the end of the president’s term and were a 
kind of ‘gift’ for the newly elected president, they went down in history un-
der the name ‘Midnight Judges’. The Senate approved all forty-two court 
appointments, on the last day of Adam as president (Bailey 1981, 18-19).  
 
However, acting Secretary of State John Marshall failed to deliver four of 
the commissions, including Marbury’s. When Thomas Jefferson took office 
on March 4, he ordered that the four remaining commissions be withheld. 




his commission. The Supreme Court issued its opinion on February 24, 
1803 (Primary Documents in American History https://www.loc.gov) 
 
This is how one of the most important litigations before the US Supreme 
Court began. In this case, was William Marbury, one of the nominated judg-
es who did not receive the commission. It should be noted here that although 
Adams’ actions were far from ethical and Jefferson repealed the act by 
which Adams made the appointment, they were made in a proper manner, 
the Senate agreed, and the problem arose due to Madison who failed the pro-
cedure initiated by the previous President. The case complicated because Jef-
ferson reduced the number of posts and manned them from scratch, ignoring 
the supporters of the Federalist party. Marbury’s only solution was to turn to 
the Supreme Court with a request for the act of nomination (writ of manda-
mus), a legal measure granted under the Judiciary Act of 1789. The case was 
so friendly that the chairman was none other than John Marshall, a federalist 
supporter. The court considered a few issues. The first of these concerned 
the right to commissions, which, in the court’s opinion, enabled the February 
1801 file concerning the District of Columbia. The second issue concerned 
the procedure for nominating a judge and, as stated by the Supreme Court.  
 
Mr. Marbury, then, since his commission was signed by the president and 
sealed by the secretary of state, was appointed; and as the law creating the of-
fice gave the officer a right to hold for five years independent of the execu-
tive, the appointment was not revocable; but vested in the officer legal rights 
which are protected by the laws of his country. To withhold the commission, 
therefore, is an act deemed by the court not warranted by law, but violative of 
a vested legal right (U. S. 137, 1803). 
 
The third issue concerned the issue of mechanisms for securing infringed 
rights. In the Marbury’s case, it was about granting a legal measure that 
would allow him to receive the commission and take office (writ of manda-
mus). It is this element of the ruling that has introduced a new look at the 
role of the Supreme Court. Judge Marshall noted that the Judiciary Act of 
1789, to which Marbury referred, confers powers on the judges of the Su-
preme Court, which violates Article III of the Constitution itself. The court 
questioned the legitimacy of the functioning of a national law that is not con-
sistent with the Constitution (U. S. 137, 1803). He decided that the role of 
the constitution should be considered. Is it a supreme act or an act with the 
rank of an ordinary law that can be changed when the legislator so chooses. 
If it is a superior act, then the act which is contrary to it is not a right. If, 
however, it is treated as an ordinary statute, “then written constitutions are 
absurd attempts, on the part of the people, to limit a power in its own nature 
illimitable” (U. S. 137, 1803). The court upheld the recognition of the consti-




tution as constituting the fundamental and most important law. But what 
about the legal acts that are incompatible with it? Do they still bind the 
courts? The next dilemma concerned the application of provisions incon-
sistent with the constitution by the courts in the course of the case. As he 
noted, “If then the courts are to regard the constitution; and the constitution 
is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature; the constitution, and not 
such ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply. Those then 
who controvert the principle that the constitution is to be considered, in 
court, as a paramount law, are reduced to the necessity of maintaining that 
courts must close their eyes on the constitution and see only the law” (U. S. 
137, 1803). The verdict stated that the judges cannot ignore the constitution, 
they cannot close their eyes. How can you examine the rights and obligations 
arising from the constitution without examining the instrument on the basis 
of which they were created? Furthermore, the role of the judges’ oaths and 
promises to perform their duties in accordance with the constitution was re-
called. According to this statement, a ruling was refused on the matter, con-
sidering the Judiciary Act from 1801 to be unconstitutional. As documented, 
“Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United States 
confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all written 
constitutions, that a law repugnant to the constitution is void, and that courts, 
as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument” (U. S. 137, 
1803). 
The ruling, in this case, was undoubtedly an important point in the history 
of constitutional law in America. Clearly confirmed the power of American 
judges to review the constitutionality of legislative acts. It helped not only 
shape the judiciary as an independent authority, resistant to political influ-
ence but also gave practice to the examination of the law’s compliance with 
the law of a hierarchically higher-order constitutional context. As Ryszard 
Małajny observes, “from the judgment in the case of William Marbury v. 
James Madison, it appears that the Constitution is an act of the highest legal 
force, binding on all organs. Therefore, all acts contrary to the Constitution 
are invalid and the common courts have the right to examine the conformity 
of these acts, the application of the Constitution and its interpretation. There-
fore, if the norms of statutes are contrary to the constitution, the norms of the 
constitution should be used as a hierarchically higher act” (Małajny 1985, 
253). Although the ruling in this matter was not the first to deal with the is-
sue of the constitutionality of federal acts and was criticized, it is impossible 






The idea of a judicial review without a doubt, though expressis verbis was 
not articulated in the United States constitution, it found its place in the judi-
cial practice of the supreme court. However, the role of the judgment in the 
case of William Marbury v. James Madison should not be overstated. Alt-
hough this is undoubtedly the most popular ruling cited in the context of ju-
dicial review, it is hard not to get the impression that the idea of judicial 
review rooted in Anglo-Saxon political thought has become a convenient so-
lution to the political dispute that put judges in a situation between a rock 
and a hard place. Although we currently treat judicial review as a universal 
tool for examining the constitutionality of legal acts and thus an institution 
that falls within the framework of modern democracy, the first judgments of 
the Supreme Court treated the idea of judicial review primarily as a tool for 
political control of both legislature and executive. On the other hand, such a 
function of the supreme court also confers a special place on the constitution 
itself, which is no longer just the will of the nation but, above all, a funda-
mental and supreme law directly applicable. 
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